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The allocation of authority is without a doubt a key component of organizational 
architecture and moreover necessary for the grasp of organizations. This 
statement already dates back to the organizational theorists Coase (1937) and 
Simon (1951) who explained the existence of authority with the concept of 
incomplete contracts deriving from uncertainty and intangibility of assets (in this 
case mostly knowledge). The concept of authority was enhanced in the mid 
1980’s by Grossmann and Hart’s (1986) definition of authority as a decision 
right over the use of an asset. They state that “…a firm that owns a machine 
may not be able to sell it without the permission of the lenders for which the 
machine serves as collateral; more generally, a firm may give another firm 
specific authority over its machines…” (Grossmann and Hart, 1986), which 
distinguishes ownership rights from authority.  
In 1997, the researcher duo Aghion and Tirole enhanced the view of 
Grossmann and Hart by distinguishing real and formal authority. The theory 
shows that an agent (lower level employee) could be granted the effective 
control over decisions (real authority), while her boss (principal) still keeps the 
formal authority, the actual right to decide. Hence, formally, she rubberstamps 
the agent’s decision. Accordingly, the decision making structure in an 
organization not only depends on formally integrated structures, like 
organizational charts or job descriptions, but also on the allocation of real 
authority. 
Despite the existence of a great deal of theoretical contributions to the 
allocation of authority in intra- (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Baker et al., 1999; 
Brickley et al., 2003; Dessein, 2002; Fehr, 2010; Malone, 1997; March 1991; 
Nagar, 2002; Stein, 2002) and interorganizational networks (Azevedo, 2009; 
Elfenbein & Lerner, 2003; Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2011; Higgins, 2006) 
empirical research on the allocation of authority falls behind. The huge gap 
between theory and empirical studies could be explained by the difficulty in 
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acquiring useful large-scale data on the allocation of authority. Most commonly, 
empirical studies are based on surveys asking one party (either the principal or 
the agent) about their influence on certain decisions in respect to the other 
party. As this measurement neither indicates a clear measure of real authority, 
nor formal authority, there is a strong suspicion that calculating both, real and 
formal authority, on the same sample is a big challenge for researchers. 
(Christie et al. (2003); Nagar (2002); Foss (2005)) So far, only two empirical 
studies try to measure both authorities, namely Li et al. (2011) and Hippmann et 
al. (2012). Li et al. (2011) determine the allocation of formal and real authority in 
intraorganizational networks. They measure CEO’s real authority counting the 
amount of words spoken in conference calls. Hippmann et al. (2012) on the 
other hand, test Aghion and Tirole’s view on allocation of authority in 
interorganizational networks, namely joint ventures. For the measure of real 
authority, they rely on survey data obtained from a questionnaire about the joint 
venture partner’s influence on decision-making on different topics.  
Main determinants on the allocation of real and formal authority found in 
empirical researches are intangible knowledge assets, uncertainties and 
incentive compensation (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Bester et al., 2008; Elridge, 
2007; Fehr, 2010; Itoh, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Paola et 
al., 2010). Aforementioned determinants are also not the easiest to measure 
accurately. 
As can be seen, the difficulty in acquiring useful data sets, the complicated 
measurement of authority and the countless approaches for measuring the 
independent variables are some of the reasons empirical testing remains 
elusive.  
Therefore, the goal of this work is to give a complete overview of existing 
researches and studies that empirically assess the allocation of authority within 
and between firms as well as networks. Based on the conceptualization of 
authority proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1997), as formal and real authority, 
determinants and measurement issues of authority are reviewed and 
discussed. As already mentioned, albeit the existence of an impressive amount 
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of literature bearing on allocation of decision making rights and authority, little 
empirical studies are found, which could derive from the fact that collecting 
useful data to empirically test these theoretical constructs is very cumbersome. 
Another possible problem could be that the necessary data to test hierarchical 
designs is based on intrafirm dynamics, which are rarely recorded. Although 
you may get access to rich data sets, the challenge of discovering plausible 
exogenous variation in hierarchical architecture remains.  
The organization and structure of the work will be as follows. In the next section 
I will describe three of the theories of new institutional economics, as most of 
the theoretical and empirical works on authority rely either on agency, property 
rights or transaction cost theory. Section 3 presents an overview of the concept 
of decision rights and determines the main variables influencing the allocation 
of decision rights in organizations, namely knowledge and uncertainties. In 
continuation, section 4 will distinguish and define intra- from/and 
interorganizational networks. In the following section 5, the most important 
theoretical models trying to explain authority with main focuses on either 
knowledge processing, incentive schemes or real & formal allocation of decision 
rights are specified. As keystone of this paper, a list of the latest empirical 
researches on the allocation of authority/decision rights with special emphasis 
on their variable measurements is provided in section 6. The list gives a near-
complete overview of the types of data and measurements used in empirical 
studies on authority. Detailed explanations of most of the empirical papers 
mentioned in the list are given and are classified based on measurement of 
either real or formal authority and on either intra- or interorganizational networks 
and their underlying main theoretical conceptualization. Finally, findings will be 
discussed and implications for future research will be addressed.  
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According to new institutional economics, institutions are formally formulated 
with informal described rules and their implementation. These rules restrict 
individuals in their transactions. The three most important theories of new 
institutional economics are discussed now in more detail, as this work will come 
across these theories in the second part. 
 
2.1 Transaction cost theory  
 
The transaction cost theory was constituted by Coase (1937) and 50 years after 
its constitution, still heavily discussed in literature. His theory was refined by 
Williamson (1973, 1975, 1991) who analyzed the efficiency of transactions in 
more detail. According to Williamson, a transaction is efficient if the 
organizational structure is selected where the sum of production costs and 
transaction costs are lowest.  
Furthermore, the theory differentiates between ex-ante and ex-post transaction 
costs. Ex-ante costs occur before the contract is accomplished and include 
search, information and bargaining costs. Ex-post costs may occur after the 
contract is signed and may include policing and enforcement costs.  
Theorists include behavioral assumptions in the view of transaction costs, such 
as bounded rationality, opportunistic behavior and risk neutrality of the 
contracting parties. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) introduced an asset 
specifity view to transaction cost economics. Specific investments give rise to 
hold-up problems. If a contracting party (A) makes a specific investment for 
working together with another firm (B), the specific investment of A gives rise to 
the bargaining power of B. Also if cooperating would be more efficient for both 
of them than working “alone”, the possible loss of bargaining power restrains 
them from cooperating. Many researchers studied the hold-up problem and 
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Klein (1995) showed that when a so-called self-enforcement mechanism is 
implemented in the contract, hold-up problems are reduced.  
Williamson (1973) states that the factors that influence transaction costs are 
asset specific investments, uncertainty and the frequency of identical 
transactions. The higher the asset specific investments and uncertainty, the 
more efficient the hierarchical organizational structure will be. Which in turn 
means that the lower the asset specifity and the uncertainty, the higher the 
efficiency for transactions over the market (decentralized organizational 
structure).  
 
2.2 Agency theory 
 
The agency theory has its roots in papers by Berle and Means (1932), Jensen 
& Meckling (1976), Holmström (1979) and tries to solve problems which arise 
“between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on 
behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a 
particular domain of decision problems.” (Ross 1973) Problems arise when the 
principal and the agent do not regulate the same objectives and for the principal 
it is hard to monitor the actions of the agent. Moreover, problems will occur 
when the agent and the principal do not have the same propensity for risk.  
Agency theory implicates the delegation of tasks and decision right 
assignments in the case of information asymmetry. This asymmetry of 
information provokes opportunistic behavior or self-interested behavior on the 
side of the party with privileged information.  
The problems which can arise between principal and agent, can arise because 
of hidden characteristics, hidden action, hidden information and hidden intention 
and can be categorized in adverse selection, moral hazard and hold up. To 
overcome these problems, agency costs (costs for signaling, screening and 
welfare loss between the best and the actual alternative) arise. From an agency 
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theory perspective, costs have to be lower than the welfare loss for not 
choosing the best alternative.  
Solutions to these problems can be provoked through hierarchical control, 
information systems, incentive-schemes, organizational culture, reputation or 
trust (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In the network theory, Lafontaine and Slade (1997) found out that networks 
often use agency theory as an explanation of their growth strategy. 
Organizations are able to grow faster than the increase of monitoring costs 
during the process of expansion. Moreover, monitoring costs also increase with 
geographic and cultural distance. 
 
2.3 Property rights theory 
 
The property rights view was first discussed by Coase (1960), Demsetz (1967) 
and Alchian (1965) and got newer contribution from Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Hart and Moore (1990), Christie (2003) and Baker et al. (2006; 2008). The 
property rights theory basically examines the ownership rights of a good.  
According to the first discussers, property rights consist of the right to use a 
good, the right to change it, the right to capture the profit or suffer the loss and 
the right to sell it and receive the revenues. The fist two rights are referred to as 
residual decision rights, whereas the last two are referred to as residual income 
or ownership rights.  
According to Hart and Moore (1990) the contractibility of intangible assets 
determines the ownership structure of the firm. The most important difference to 
the transaction cost theory is the relevance of intangible and non-contractible 
assets in the property rights approach. Demsetz (1967) stated that the property 
rights theory supports the transaction cost theory in the proper alignment of 
resources.  
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Intangible assets cannot be codified and transferred and therefore contractibility 
for intangible assets is low, whereas tangible assets are easy to transfer and 
therefore count as high contractible. Examples of intangible assets are local 
market knowledge or special skills and capabilities. Hart and Moore (1990) 
show that property rights theory disregards tangible assets and is only based on 
intangible assets, therefore depends on incomplete contracts.  
According to property rights theory, the individual with the greater amount of 
intangible assets (e.g. local market knowledge) should have more property 
rights in order to generate a higher profit. (Windsperger et al. 2006) 
 
2.4 Others 
 
Another theory that focuses on resources is the resource scarcity view. Barney 
(1991) states that by holding more and better resources that increase in some 
way the benefit for costumers, a firm can achieve competitive advantage. It is 
crucial that this firm is and stays the only one with the core competences, which 
generate the competitive advantage. Barney (1991) lists requirements for 
resources in order to generate sustainable competitive advantage. According to 
the resource scarcity view, firms’ resources have to be: valuable, unique or rare, 
immobile, non substitutable and not easy to imitate.  
A complement to the resource-based view is the relational view, which focuses 
on network resources instead of the firm’s resources (Duschek, 2004). The 
relational theory implies that network resources achieve competitive advantage 
if the network relies on idiosyncratic interorganizational resources, knowledge 
sharing routines, complementary resources and competences and institutional 
frameworks of controlling and managing the network. 
Another theory that is allied to the resource scarcity view is the organizational 
capabilities view. Organizational capabilities can be used to perform firms’ basic 
operations, improve firms or apply new strategies before the competition does. 
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This theory is closely linked to the exploration and exploitation approach. 
(Collins, 1994) 
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The allocation of decision rights in organizations is a key determinant of the 
design of hierarchical arrangements. According to Grossman & Hart (1986) the 
principle of decision rights is based on the authority to use and evolve the 
assets of a firm. Therefore this chapter will focus on the allocation of decision 
rights and their determinants.  
Figure 1 gives a good and simple overview of the determinants of business 
strategy, structure (in figure 1 referred to as “architecture”) and the value of the 
firm and highlights the importance of the allocation of decision rights, the reward 
system and an evaluation system for group or individual performance – named 
“Organizational Architecture” from Brickley et al. (2007). 
This figure shows that information and production technologies, market 
conditions and regulations determine the business strategy, which in turn has 
an important influence on the organizational architecture. The first and foremost 
target of a firm is reflected in its organizational strategy, but as it is shown, 
Alfred Chandlers (1962) “Structure follows Strategy” is just half the story. As 
strategy can be affected by architecture as well, there is a two-way arrow drawn 
to emphasize the interdependent effects of the two. Hall and Saias (1980) were 
one of the first ones to claim that structure also partly determines strategy. After 
all, strategy and architecture bias the incentives and actions of employees 
within the firm thus have major influence on the firm’s value. 
Now as coherences within an organization are outlined and decision right 
assignment is shown to be a key component of organizational design, decision 
rights should be discussed in more detail. 
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Figure 1: The Determinants of Strategy, Organizational Architecture, and Firm 
Value (modified from Brickley et al.,2007, p. 310) 
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Jensen & Meckling (1992) stated that the right to make a decision is the right to 
act and decide over a specific action and that decision rights are the economic 
bases for expressing that individuals have the “power” to decide on a certain 
topic.  
In the world of politics, the allocation of decision rights work different: A political 
party can gain the power to decide by election or a country broadly defines its 
decision right framework with its political system. The concept of decision rights 
in political systems varies intensively. In developed social systems, individuals 
or organizations mostly hold the decision right over specific tangible assets or 
physical objects. Contrary to communist systems, where the state or the ruling 
party holds most of these rights. 
According to Brickley et al. (2007) the economic price system is based on the 
existence of private property rights that include two dimensions: the right to 
sell/give the resource and the right to participate in the sales profits. The use of 
private property rights is an important attribute of a market economy. Especially 
the existence of alienable rights gives incentives to individuals to take suitable 
actions without any guidance. Which is explained by the self-regulating nature 
of the market and Adam Smiths’ concept of the “invisible hand”.  
In modern society it is mostly by law that decision rights get allocated and then 
reselling, buying or new contractual agreements restructure these rights. 
(Jensen et al. 1992) 
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3.1 Residual and specific decision rights !
Compliant with Demsetz (1998) the property rights theory distinguishes 
between two decision rights, namely residual and nonresidual (also referred to 
as specific) decision rights.  
 
Specific decision rights 
As for specific decision rights, contracts are used to specify the assigned rights 
precisely. These specific decision rights assign an individual in a specific 
situation under specific circumstances, rights and obligations. Furthermore 
nonresidual decision rights bear on the use of tangible (explicit) knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge can be transferred, codified and captured easily. This 
implies that organizational processes are documentable and can be transferred 
to another individual without a lot of effort (Grossmann et al 1986). Cowan et al. 
(2004) describe explicit knowledge as codes or standards, which can be written 
down in manuals or rules and be distributed by authorities or it can also be 
consented through constant use. 
 
Residual decision rights 
On the contrary, residual decision rights relate to the authority to affect the use 
of knowledge, which is not as easy to transfer, capture or codify as tangible 
knowledge. Residual decision rights are rights, which are not agreed by 
contract and often refer to market or system specific knowledge. Cowan et al. 
(2004) imply that tacit knowledge is mainly personal knowledge, which consists 
of information and social knowledge and thus is undefined and undifferentiated. 
Grossmann and Hart (1986) describe it as individual abilities and skills which 
are being developed by individuals during the work process without them 
noticing. In other words they are not aware of developing abilities and therefore 
they cannot describe or transfer their knowledge to others. Windsperger et al. 
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(2004) investigated networks, more precisely franchising networks: “in 
franchising, residual decision rights refer to the authority to influence the use of 
the franchisor’s system-specific assets and the franchisee’s local market assets, 
which are intangible and hence difficult to specify in contracts.” 
Jensen and Meckling (1992) intensively worked on “specific and general 
knowledge” and they refer to specific knowledge as cost intense to transfer and 
general knowledge as very inexpensive to transfer. Therefore they use these 
terms to differentiate “between knowledge at the extremes of the continuum 
measuring transfer costs”.  
 
3.2 Centralization and Decentralization 
 
The question whether to decentralize or not derives from the allocation of 
decision rights. A relatively large literature has examined the choice between 
centralization and decentralization and literature about this topic celebrated 
resurgence with the advent of new communication and information 
technologies. Information technology simplifies the exchange of information and 
moreover makes it easier and cheaper to transfer and store knowledge and 
information and therefore favors centralization.  
But this is also true the other way round: information and especially enhanced 
telecommunication technology facilitated also the communication flow from 
headquarters to the local markets and as a result improves decentralized 
decision-making. (Malone, 1997) 
In other cases it favored decentralization because of fast changing market 
conditions and production technologies. Firms have to adjust promptly to these 
changes in order to stay competitive and if lower management or local 
employees hold the knowledge of the newest technologies, decision rights need 
to be delegated to them. Another factor preferring empowerment of employees 
is the fact that over the last decades competition has grown due to globalization 
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in many industries, therefore forced companies to take preferences into account 
local in order to stay competitive. 
Another recent trend is that new technologies helped firms to flatten their 
hierarchy, as they do not need the middle management as carrier of information 
and rules from senior managers to employees on a lower level in the hierarchy 
(Brickley et al. 2007). 
The assortment of centralization versus decentralization depends on the 
compromise between efficient use of knowledge available to agents derived 
from decentralized decision-making and the benefit of coordination and control 
allowed by a centralized structure. (Paola et al. 2010). 
Decades ago, Hayek (1945) already pointed out two major problems in the 
design of efficient economic structures. The first major problem is the optimal 
use of knowledge and the other one is the question who should design the 
decision making structure of a firm. The choice of one structure over the other 
depends on the possibility to transfer knowledge, which is distributed among 
many individuals to just one central authority and on agents using their 
knowledge in a way so that the use of it maximizes the firm’s value.  
Before deciding on the decision making structure it is essential to know the 
characteristics of human decision-making: 
-What is the objective of the decision maker? 
-Which alternatives does the decision maker have? 
-Which restrictions does the decision maker face? 
A rational decision as a result of these questions would be the one, which 
correlates best with the decision maker’s objectives. 
But as humans are not rational by nature, the final decision depends on more 
factors. Brickley et al. (2007) derive two factors crucial for the election of 
alternatives: knowledge factor (depends on the knowledge and information the 
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decision maker holds) and the motivation factor (depends on the objectives of 
the decision maker). 
Brickley et al. (2007) point out that the world of decision making is not just black 
and white, but mostly grey. Which means that a firm almost never (if it has a 
certain size) completely centralized nor completely decentralized. Some 
decision rights might be delegated to a lower level and others might stay at the 
CEO. Also, one decision can be split in different components and some 
components can be delegated and others are maintained on a higher level in 
the hierarchy (Christie et al. 2003). So as for Brickley et al. (2007) “the decision 
authority of an employee can be increased without granting the employee all 
rights to a particular decision.” 
Brickley et al. structured the components of decisions as follow: 
-Initiation 
-Ratification 
-Implementation 
-Monitoring 
Fama et al. (1983) merge the components of initiation and implementation in 
the term “decision management”, whereas ratification plus monitoring is 
summarized by the term “decision control”. Which completely makes sense 
because of incentive problems. Since an employee has both of the 
aforementioned decision rights for one decision, dysfunctional behavior can be 
provoked and it is likely that the agent will make a decision that maximizes his 
own benefit and not the one of the firm.  
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3.2.1 Benefits of Decentralization  
 
Local Knowledge (Brickley et al. 2007) 
As mentioned before, if a firm is decentralized and competes in an industry 
where local market knowledge is important, one of the big advantages is that a 
firm is able to respond faster to changing market conditions, because decision 
rights are delegated to local managers who probably have more local market 
knowledge than principals at the headquarter. Furthermore, local knowledge is 
likely to be tacit and therefore expensive and time consuming to transfer. In a 
centralized system the local manager would have to ask for permission to the 
headquarter and in return, the headquarter has to inform the local manager how 
to act. These actions are time consuming and could result in delays in 
production, loss in sales or other negative impacts. Brickley et al. state 
“…granting decision rights to the local managers promotes more rapid decision 
making and quicker responses to changing market conditions.” This benefit is 
especially true for networks as they traditionally work in many different 
surroundings.  
 
Management time (Brickley et al. 2007) 
Whenever decision rights are delegated to lower level employees, managers 
are relieved of work and thus have more time to concentrate on other decisions. 
Brickley et al. (2007) state that generally it is more efficient to delegate 
operative decisions to agents or lower level managers and centralize strategic 
decision making rights.  
 
Motivation (Brickley et al. 2007) 
Delegation of decision rights to local managers or lower level employees gives 
employees a good training in decision-making. Moreover, a higher degree of 
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responsibility attracts and maintains talented employees. Furthermore the 
incentive of searching for new projects is increased by delegation.  
 
3.2.2 Costs of Decentralization 
 
Incentive Problems – Agency Costs (Brickley et al. 2007) 
As described the role of knowledge in the decision of centralization and 
decentralization, it always seems better to delegate decision-making rights to 
the level where the knowledge is present. This would be true if the best 
alternative for the agent and for the firm were the same. But in reality, this will 
only occur if the owner and the decision maker are the same person. As a 
result, the principal has to set the right incentives for the agent in order to 
assure that he makes the decision that maximizes the firm’s value. Therefore, 
the firm has to develop a monitoring and control system in order to measure the 
effect of the agents’ decisions on the firm. However, it is nearly impossible to 
find out to what extent an agent individually affects the firm’s profits. Hence 
firms have to develop the most accurate incentive systems and compensation 
schemes in order to get close to the perfect situation. There is no incentive 
system that will remove these troubles completely. However, one has to take 
into account that compensation systems have their price as well. 
 
Coordination (Brickley et al. 2007) 
If decision rights are delegated, local managers in different outlets are likely to 
make all decisions independently although some of the decisions have to be 
made for every outlet. If decisions which have to be made many times or for 
more outlets (e.g. price decisions) were to be centralized, costs could be 
decreased. These costs derive from either internal competition (if nearby outlets 
set different prices) or by redundancy (interaction effects on advertisement or 
market analysis for nearby outlets). 
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Central Information (Brickley et al. 2007) 
Central managers often have valuable knowledge and experience that can be 
useful for the local manager. Local managers are likely to have tacit knowledge 
about their specific markets, however central managers have a different tacit 
knowledge, which is often neglected in decentralized systems. The central 
manager gains experience and knowledge over time from different markets 
whereas the local manager is limited to the information he gains from one 
market. This unused knowledge could lead to repeating errors and reoccurring 
mistakes. The contempt of economics of scale could be very cost intense. 
Therefore also in decentralized firms there should be a top-down information 
flow and a coordination of relevant information for the local manager. As this 
work already pointed out, transfer of knowledge can be very expensive. The 
more important information is held by local managers and the more 
independent the product demands and costs for the local market, the lower the 
costs of coordination. Therefore, every firm has to find a trade off between 
information and coordination as well as a trade off between the loss of local 
knowledge and a loss of economies of scale.  
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3.3 Determinants of the allocation of decision making rights 
 
In this chapter, the factors influencing the degree of hierarchy or 
decentralization are explained. These factors are crucial for the empirical 
studies, which concentrate on the calculation of authority and are discussed in 
the second part of the work. 
There are numerous different factors determining the degree of authority 
discussed in literature, though this work will stick mainly to the determinants 
formulated by Malone (1997). He sets his focus on the influence of information 
technology on centralization and decentralization. He formulated decision 
information, trust and motivation as the main factors of influence on where and 
how decisions are made. 
Malone (1997) describes more factors, which can have an effect on the degree 
of centralization and decentralization of decision rights. Among others, 
communication costs, competitive dynamics, information, personal motivation, 
former hierarchical structure of the firm, government regulations, tradition of the 
firm, individual characteristics of employees, national culture, managerial egos, 
can all have a tremendous influence on hierarchical structures.  
Hendrikse and Windsperger (2011) predict the influences of “behavioral 
uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees’ specific investments 
(negatively), environmental uncertainty (negatively), intangibility of system 
specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively)” on 
contractual completeness in franchise systems. They provided evidence of the 
negative influence of behavioral uncertainty, the positive influence of trust and 
the negative influence of specific knowledge on the complete contracts. 
As shown in figure 2, the costs and benefits of these influencing factors 
determine the degree of centralization. 
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Figure 2: Trade off between total costs & benefits and the degree of 
decentralization (modified from Brickley et al. 2007; p. 335) 
 
Assuming that decisions can be decentralized in varying degrees we can find 
the degree of decentralization (D) on the horizontal axis. If D=0, all decisions 
are centralized. The higher D, the more decision rights are owned by local or 
lower level managers. D* represents the degree of decentralization where the 
net benefits are maximized. The costs of decentralization include incentive 
problems, coordination costs and the knowledge transfer from the senior 
manager to the lower-level employee, whereas benefits of decentralization 
include the use of local knowledge, motivation factor for lower level employees 
and the economization of time for the senior management. If the benefits 
decrease (local knowledge gets less important because of changes in demand), 
D* will shift to the left, ergo the firm should centralize more decisions and vice 
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versa. If the costs decrease (information technology makes knowledge transfer 
more inexpensive), D* will shift to the right, which means decision rights should 
be more decentralized. If there are shifts in the degree of decentralization, it is 
crucial to make corresponding changes in the performance measurement and 
reward system. (Brickley et al. 2007) 
 
3.3.1 Information and knowledge  !
As previously stated in many parts of this work already stated, knowledge or 
information is a crucial object in the organization economics or as Malone 
(1997) states “making good decisions requires good information.” The work 
“The use of knowledge in society” by F.A. Hayek was pioneer work on this topic 
and he was the first in finding out that: “…it is a problem of utilization of 
knowledge not given to anyone in its totality.” 
To have an efficient organization, it is crucial to unite decision rights with the 
necessary knowledge and there are two different ways of doing so: You can 
delegate the right to decide to the individual with the corresponding knowledge 
or you can transfer the knowledge to the individual who possesses the 
corresponding decision rights (Windsperger, 2002; Jensen & Meckling 1992). 
This point indicates that the cost of knowledge transfer determines the degree 
of centralization.  
Li et al. (2009) express problems, which arise at these 2 alternatives. If a firm 
prefers transferring knowledge to transferring decision rights, it will face costs of 
knowledge transfer. On the contrary, the firm will face losses in control, as a 
self-interested agent may not take an optimal decision for the firm.  
To find the most efficient degree of decision right allocation, costs of bad 
decisions because of insufficient knowledge have to be in balance with the 
costs of knowledge transfer.  
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Influencing factors on knowledge transfer costs 
As pointed out earlier, the cost of knowledge transfer determines the degree of 
centralization. Therefore it is necessary to know which determinants affect the 
cost of knowledge transfer. This in turn, depends on the different types of 
knowledge. If a firm mainly produces information that is very expensive to 
transfer to the principal, firms tend to decentralize decision rights to lower level 
employees (Li et al. 2009). On the other hand, the CEO will stick to his decision 
rights if the transfer of knowledge to the headquarter is inexpensive 
(Windsperger, 2002; Paola et al. 2010). 
 
Types of Knowledge and their capabilities of transfer 
Information vs. knowledge: 
In organization theory information and knowledge are used synonymous, but 
eventually one has to differentiate. Nonaka (1994) describes information as a 
flow of messages, whereas knowledge is being created out of information and 
the effort of the information holder.  
Explicit vs. tacit knowledge 
Explicit knowledge is easy to transform to a formal and systematic language 
and therefore uncomplicated to transfer. Quite contrary to tacit or sticky 
knowledge, which is hard to transmit to another person (Nonka 1994). 
General vs. specific knowledge 
Jensen & Meckling (1992) use the terms general and specific knowledge, which 
are equitable to explicit and tacit knowledge respectively. 
Idiosyncratic knowledge 
This kind of knowledge is similar to specific knowledge but the particularity is 
that it is related to products or services and it depends on time and location. 
Therefore this knowledge can get useless if it does not get utilized in time. The 
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factor time makes it even more expensive and complicated to transfer (Brickley 
et al. 2007; Jensen & Meckling 1992). 
Assembled knowledge 
This kind of knowledge is gained with experience or through repetition of the 
same work. Therefore it is not as easy to transfer as explicit knowledge but not 
as hard as idiosyncratic knowledge. (Brickley et al. 2007) 
Scientific knowledge 
Scientific knowledge is hard to transfer if the receiver is a non-scientist, 
because he does not have the relevant background knowledge to understand 
the information. (Brickley et al. 2007) 
 
Thus if an agent or a local manager has tacit, specific and idiosyncratic 
knowledge, he should as well have the decision rights to maximize the income, 
as this is the kind of knowledge that is not easily communicably and is hard to 
specify in contracts because of high transaction costs. (Windsperger 2002). On 
the other hand, Aghion et al. (1997) state that it is always (whether general or 
specific knowledge) more efficient to assign the decision rights to those “who 
are best able to use the intangible resource assets” (Windsperger 2002). 
Information technology plays an important role in minimizing costs of knowledge 
transfer. Moreover it made a structure of decision rights in an environment, that 
requires intense communication, even possible. Furthermore it decreased the 
importance of physical distance. In the case of tacit knowledge, information 
technology should be used to bring decisions to the places where this specific 
knowledge is located and not the other way round. Because as stated above, 
there is information that is hard to transfer even with the help of latest 
information technology (Malone 1997). 
Hendrikse and Windsperger (2011) predict a negative relation between the 
intangible knowledge and a complete contract in networks. This means in other 
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words, the higher the intangibility of knowledge of one part of a contract, the 
more incomplete is the contract. This leads to the allocation of decision rights to 
the part with the specific knowledge. 
 
Exploration and Exploitation 
As already mentioned, the concept of exploration and exploitation is important 
in the theory of organizational capabilities (Collis, 1994). 
March (1991) defines two types of learning, namely exploitation and 
exploration. The organization has to balance the exploration of new knowledge 
and the exploitation of existing knowledge, which have the same importance. 
March (1991) therefore defines exploration as “things captured by terms such 
as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery and 
innovation.” On the other hand there is exploitation, defined as “refinement, 
choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation and execution.” 
 
3.3.2 Trust !
As Malone (2007) states in his paper, “trust is fundamental”. Common sense 
tells us, that you do not want another person make decisions on your behalf if 
you do not trust this person. Employed on organizational design, this means 
that senior managers will beware to allocate decision rights to lower level 
employees, who in the eyes of senior managers are not trustworthy. Indeed, if 
the senior manager has to delegate, he will control the lower level employee 
extensively which will result in high monitoring and controlling costs. 
Within the huge amount of different definitions for trust, they all have two basic 
ideas in common: positive expectations towards the intentions and the behavior 
of the other party and the acceptance of being vulnerable (Rousseau et al. 
1998; Sabel 1993; Meyer et al. 1995). 
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The aspect of trust is closely linked to the incompleteness of contracts. In 
transaction cost theory analysis is oriented on the “Organizational Failure 
Framework” (Williamson 1975). Williamson has made two basic assumptions on 
trust of partners: bounded rationality and opportunism. If complete contracts 
exist, these two assumptions would not pose any risk at all. But many 
researchers found out (eg. Hart & Holmström 1987) that it is almost impossible 
to reach contractual completeness thus general contracts are seen as 
incomplete.  
There are two different approaches in the relational governance view on the 
influence of trust in contractual relationships: substitutability view and the 
complementary view. In the complementary view, trust can have a positive 
influence on the completeness of contracts, because trust provokes better and 
more honest communication and therefore enables the formulation of more 
precise and specified contracts. The substitutability view, as its name already 
reveals, looks at trust as a substitute for contractual completeness. As residual 
decision rights can hardly be formulated or written down, trust has to have an 
influence on the distribution of residual decision rights. If contracting partners 
trust each other, they will be more comfortable using less complete contracts 
(Hendrikse & Windsperger 2011). 
 
3.3.3 Motivation !
The factor “motivation” will become more important as modern technology will 
cause a lot of physical work to vanish and therefore in the future the number of 
knowledge jobs will increase and innovation becomes more vital for the success 
of a firm (Malone 1997; Manson 2007). 
Fehr et al. (2010) argue that economists often forget about the psychological 
effects of economic models, such as authority and hierarchical structures on 
employees. Some studies have deduced that autonomy (decentralization) can 
have a positive impact on well-being, job satisfaction and on the health of 
!.?!
employees (Benz and Frey 2003, Baard, Deci, and Ryan 2004; Marmot 
and Wilkinson 1999: in Fehr et al. 2010). 
Fehr et al. (2010) state: “The self-employed are also willing to accept lower risk-
adjusted returns on investment and accept lower wages for work. These 
findings suggest that there may be non-pecuniary value to having power which 
could influence the effects of authority and generate frictions in the delegation 
of authority.” 
Malone (1997) explains, that it highly depends on the kind of work if 
empowerment increases the motivation of workers. For workers who purely 
exercise physical work or a work with a high degree of repetition, autonomy 
won’t have a big influence on their motivation. Workers in these kind of jobs 
mainly prefer a centralized system. In other words, they will improve efficiency if 
they have somebody who tells them what to do. In more academic jobs, 
employees will be more motivated if they have a certain degree of autonomy 
and decision making rights. The researcher illustrates this with the idea that 
when individuals are allowed to make their own decisions on how and when to 
do their work they tend to be more delighted with their jobs and thus put more 
time, effort and thinking into it. Therefore the quality of decisions will increase as 
their motivation increases and to induce a higher degree of motivation a firm 
has to empower their local managers. 
 
3.3.4 Uncertainties !
In transaction cost theory the influence of uncertainties on decision-making in 
an organizational scope is a crucial point. (Williamson 1975) In strategic 
management science, uncertainties also play a key role in strategic important 
decision-making. In 1985 March et al. highlighted that uncertainties are 
important variables to explain a firm’s behavior.  
Windsperger and Jell (2005) also showed that uncertainties have a big impact 
on the decision making structure of organizations. They state that a high degree 
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of environmental and behavioral uncertainties make a centralized decision 
making structure difficult because of an increased demand for control and 
monitoring. Thus an organization has to face higher costs for control. 
Uncertainty is a condition that describes a certain situation of decision-making 
in a certain environment. According to the principle of cause and effect of 
organizational decisions, uncertainty describes a situation, where an action is 
already taken or a decision is made due to forecasts about the possible 
outcome. Thus, the better the forecasts, the smaller the uncertainties (Leblebici 
et al. 1981). 
 
3.3.4.1 Uncertainties versus Risk !
Transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975) and incomplete contract theories 
(Grossmann & Hart 1986) employ on conditions of risk but both should be 
modified for conditions of uncertainty.  
Alvarez and Barney (2005) examined in their paper the differences between 
uncertainty and risk and state that most strategic management literature talks 
about risk and uncertainties synonymously, but to differentiate between these 
two concepts has long practice and dates back as far as 1921 when Knight 
wrote about the distinction. Conditions of uncertainty and risk can have a high 
influence on how firms organize their processes and their structures. A strategic 
decision, which is either made under risk or uncertainty, will differ depending on 
the chosen concept (risk or uncertainty) and therefore organizational theory 
should take into account the difference between those two. 
Some examples from Alvarez and Barney (2005) include the business planning 
techniques, which under risk seem to apply but under uncertainty not. For this 
case and the concept on uncertainty, agility and flexibility will be more vital. 
Another example stated, shows that in a risky environment, the primary source 
of capital will be banks and venture capital firms, whereas in an uncertain 
environment a relation of trust for exchanging capitals and resources will be 
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more valuable than banks or venture capital firms. They also point out that 
“under risk, it may be reasonable to think of opportunities as objective 
phenomena waiting to be discovered by unusually alert entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 
1973; Shane, 2003). However, under uncertainty, entrepreneurs do not 
“discover” opportunities as create them through their organizing efforts.” 
 
3.3.4.2 Environmental uncertainties !
Environmental uncertainties are uncertainties, which derive from economic, 
cultural, political and legal unpredictability from an unknown market and this 
kind of uncertainties affect the contract design as well as the governance 
structure (Williamson 1975). 
Economic uncertainties can be changes in the organizational or economic 
environment of a region or country. Whereas political and legal uncertainties 
derive mostly from transferring property or investments or from the lack of legal 
protection of property and ownership rights for foreign organizations. Cultural 
uncertainties proceed from differences in the culture of countries or regions. 
The bigger the cultural differences are, the greater the uncertainty becomes 
(Alvarez et al. 2005). 
The degree of environmental uncertainty of a firm is determined by its 
complexity. Examples of drivers of environmental uncertainty could be 
increasing demand, fluctuating prices, problems deriving from acquisition or 
high competition. From heterogeneity and quantity of external elements derives 
the complexity of the environment, which is crucial for organizational 
transactions (Daft 1998). 
Diversification derives from the approach to minimize the influence of 
uncertainties in the environment. Organizations try to control and regulate 
uncertainties with diversification (Boyle, 1999). 
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Environmental uncertainty also makes it more difficult to set up complete and 
detailed contracts and therefore it enhances the requirement of ex-post 
adaptations by assigning residual decision rights (Hendrikse & Windsperger 
2011). 
 
3.3.4.3 Behavioral uncertainties !
According to Williamson (1985) and the theory of transaction costs, behavioral 
uncertainties derive from the complexity of controlling the contractual efficiency 
of the contract partner. This increases the costs of performance measurement, 
because it is difficult to verify if the other party stuck to the contractual 
agreements.  
The complexity of managing behavioral uncertainty is to forecast the actions of 
the other party, in particular the capability of opportunistic behavior ex-ante or 
ex-post. Williamson (1975) describes opportunistic behavior with self-interest, 
fraud, giving incorrect and faulty information and making wrong statements to 
the opponent in order to make more profit at the cost of the opponent. It is a 
strategic non-announcement and distortion of information. 
According to Hendrikse and Windsperger (2010) opportunism and asymmetric 
information lead to an increase in agency costs. There are two alternatives to 
lowering agency costs again: increase monitoring and control or increase 
empowerment. The higher the behavioral uncertainty, the more residual 
decision rights should be delegated to agents but the less specific rights can be 
contracted. However, as specific rights are not formulated in contracts, 
behavioral uncertainty evokes contractual incompleteness.  
At the end of this chapter the factors, which influence the degree of hierarchy 
and delegation are summarized and it is shown how each factor can affect the 
trend to either centralization or decentralization. To illustrate these 
dependencies, a figure from Malone (1997) is used. (Figure 3) 
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Factor 
Centralization 
is desirable when ... 
Decentralization 
is desirable when ... 
 
Information 
 
Remote information is valuable in 
decision making, and can be 
communicated to central decision 
makers at moderate cost 
 
Local decision makers have access to 
important information that cannot be 
easily communicated to central 
decision makers 
OR 
Remote information is not valuable in 
local decision making (“Cowboys”) 
OR 
Remote information is valuable in 
decision making and inexpensive to 
communicate (“Cyber-Cowboys”) 
 
 
Trust 
 
Central decision makers do not 
want to (or cannot) trust local 
decision makers to make important 
decisions 
 
Local decision makers do not want (or 
cannot) trust central decision makers to 
make important decisions 
 
 
Motivation 
 
Local decision makers work harder 
or better when told what to do by 
someone else 
 
Local decision makers work harder or 
better when they make decisions for 
themselves  
 
Table 1: When (de)centralization is desirable (modified from Malone, 1997). 
 
As one can see, the factor of uncertainty is missing in this table. As stated 
above, the higher the uncertainties, the more desirable is decentralization due 
to difficulties and costs that arise because of increased demand for control. 
(Windsperger and Jell 2005) 
 
! --!
9"#$%&'2:#2%)#,%&/'('72%,;2&,(%23#%/&0('<1##
 
As this work will distinguish empirical studies discussed in chapter 6 on their 
organizational design, in this chapter a definition of the terms intra and 
interorganizational networks will be given.  
 
4.1 Intraorganizational networks  
 
Network organizations or intraorganizational networks consist of members of 
the same organizational entity, which are interrelated either horizontally or 
vertically and are used to organize subunits. These subunits or teams can be 
organized by work groups depending on function, geography or specific 
projects. The foundation of internal networks can be either based on 
organizational hierarchies described in organizational charts (formal hierarchy) 
or on friendships and personal contacts (real hierarchy). However, Brickley et 
al. (2007) state that “relationships among these work groups are determined by 
the demands of specific projects and work activities rather than by formal lines 
of authority.” Thus they are mostly informal relationships, which can’t be seen 
on organizational charts or official job descriptions. These informal relationships 
complement or sometimes also interfere with the existing formal organizational 
structure. Therefore, a differentiation of formal and real authority is essential to 
explain dependencies in organizational architecture. 
When there are changes in the environment, these groups are likely to change 
as well. Their biggest advantage lies in the fast and easy flow of information 
inside the groups as well as in the speed of reaction to changes. Their main 
disadvantages are their implicit trust in their agreements and their informal 
relations, which can give rise to opportunistic behavior and misapprehension.  
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As one can see, informal relationships have different advantages and 
disadvantages than formal relationships, which indicates that empirical 
researchers on the topic of allocation of authority should pay regard to that.  
 
4.2 Interorganizational networks !
Network is a broad term to define. Many talk about partnerships, cooperative 
arrangements, coalitions or interorganizational relationships. Despite all these 
different names, all definitions have some characteristics in common, namely 
relationships, social interaction, trust, collaboration and collective action.  
Brass et al. (2004) give a very broad definition and state that a network is a 
batch of “nodes and ties” which represent relationships between the nodes. 
Podolny et al. (1998) include forms of cooperations in their definition of 
networks, like joint ventures and strategic alliances. As for Tuunanen, 
Windsperger, Cliquet and Hendrikse (2011), franchising, alliances and 
cooperatives form part of networks. Barringer and Harrison (2000) for example 
define networks as “constellations of organizations that come together through 
the establishment of social contracts or agreements. “ 
Therefore this paper will not provide the reader with a single definition of 
networks, but use the term network in a broad sense as collaboration between 
at least two firms.  
In section 6 of this work, we will come across two prominent entrepreneurial 
forms of networks, namely franchising and joint ventures. Therefore, a short 
description of these kinds of networks will be given.  
In general terms, franchising is a relationship between a franchisor, who is the 
founder of the franchising and developed a certain business format and 
franchisee, who buys rights for using the franchisors business format. The 
franchisor evolved either a specific product or service and is responsible for the 
management of the network of different independent franchisees. Whereas the 
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franchisee buys a royalty fee for using the franchisors operating systems, 
products or brand name (Norton, 1988). 
Joint ventures are enterprises that are operated by at least two legal and 
economic independent partners. A joint venture is characterized by congruent 
goals and shared management activities from both participating parties. Also, 
both partners share the possible risk resulting from the joint venture (Weder, 
1989). 
!-6!
="#>8/('/&,+23#+(%+/?&1#
 
This work has already given a comprehensive overview of the literature on the 
allocation of authority. The basic theories and general ideas underlying the 
empirical papers have been explained, but now this work will specialize on 
recently published literature treating the topic of authority. Furthermore, the 
amount of theoretical models and concepts on this topic is much higher than 
their corresponding empirical research. This fact could derive from the 
difficulties of suitable large-scale data for empirical tests. In chapter 7, this 
problem will be discussed in more detail. 
The main theoretical models of the last decade on delegation, centralization, 
authority and the allocation of decision rights are presented in this paper. The 
election of models in this paper is far from being complete, as there are 
countless theoretical frameworks about this topic. However, emphasis is placed 
on the models and frameworks mostly used by the empirical articles that will be 
discussed in the second part.  
The basic problem when allocating decision rights resides in the fact that 
decisions made in an organization affect not only the decision maker himself, 
but also other members of the organization. Common sense tells us, that if 
others have an influence on one’s well being, problems are likely to arise. 
Simon (1951) already pointed out that “the worker has no assurance that the 
employer will consider anything but his own profit in deciding what he will ask 
the worker to do”. In other means, one with the power to make a decision will 
behave opportunistically and always choose the decision that is his best 
interest. This can be the decision, which brings him the least amount of work or 
the highest profit, depending on his preferences. While others, who are affected 
by this decision, are likely to have other preferences and therefore the decision 
taken by another person will not be optimal for them.  
Members could write a complete contract, which ensures that everybody takes 
the decisions that lead to the maximum joint surplus. But literature found out, 
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that it is impossible (due to high costs and the fact that decisions are 
unverifiable to outsiders) to legally specify all of a firm’s future decisions in 
advance. (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990)  
There are numerous works addressed to investigate the allocation of authority 
and decision making power in organizations. These works approach two basic 
ideas: one part concentrates on the organization of knowledge and its 
acquisition, transfer, storage and communication, while the other part 
investigates the incentive issues which arise due to agency problems.  
 
5.1 Theories on authority in intraorganizational networks 
 
This section distinguishes studies on authority in intra and interorganization 
networks and their main subject of investigation. 
 
5.1.1 Theories on knowledge processing 
 
All the papers which investigate the organization of knowledge are based on the 
concept of congruent objectives of the principal and the agent. They consider 
factors like the cost of information transfer and communication, advantages in 
decision-making and costs of wrong or late decision-making. Therefore they 
ignore the problem of diverse objectives of the principal and the agent. 
According to Simon (1973) and the concept of bounded rationality, information 
is not the scarce resource, but the capacity to attend this information is.  
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) indicate that in a centralized structure, a smaller quantity 
of projects is selected compared to more decentralized organizations. 
According to their study, when projects or alternatives are mostly of a good type 
(positive outcome), decentralization is favorable. 
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As for Bolton et al. (1994) a decentralized structure allows agents to specialize 
in tasks. Therefore firms can fully deploy their economic opportunities arising 
from local resources and task specialization by delegating decision rights to the 
local manager with the needed knowledge.  
The work of Dessein (2002) also follows the first approach and made an 
important contribution to the studies of the relationship between authority and 
communication in organizations. His paper emphasizes on delegation as an 
alternative to communication and shows that as long as the incentive conflict 
and the principals’ uncertainty regarding the environment is not too large, the 
principal will always prefer to delegate decision rights over communicating with 
the agent. Additional research on this topic can be found from Alonso et al. 
(2008). Aghion et al (2004) are showing that the transfer of authority can 
facilitate communication.  
Other literature on information processing, like Radner (1993) and Van Zandt 
(1999) imply that in centralized systems, errors and delays in the disclosure of 
information from top to bottom arise frequently. Thus, projects defined by the 
principal and implemented by the agent might just be different because of 
inefficiencies in intraorganizational communication and may not bring the 
planned benefit because of delays. Therefore, they state that decentralization 
reduces delays and as a result, may increase benefits. 
 
5.1.2 Theories on incentive problems 
 
The second approach focuses on the dissolution of the agency problem with the 
help of incentives. One of the most influential works in the last decades is the 
one from Aghion and Tirole (1997). They derived a principal agent model, which 
tries to show how delegation of authority can have an impact on the 
performance of individuals through incentives for the agent to acquire 
information. Delegation allows the agent to choose an alternative that 
maximizes his own benefit and therefore increases the effort of searching 
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information regarding the projects. Which in turn for the principal results in a 
loss of control as the projects chosen by the agent do not maximize the profit of 
the principal. Opportunistic behavior of agents can be controlled only to a 
certain extent by allocating some decision rights to the agent, as this theoretical 
model neglects monetary compensation and assumes different preferences and 
objectives of agent and principal.  
The same problem was investigated by Stein (2002) who tried to determine the 
effects of decision-making structure on the incentives to obtain information and 
knowledge. He makes allowances for the distinct information types, namely 
hard (verifiable) and soft information (not verifiable). He shows that a 
decentralized approach is preferable when information about projects is soft 
whereas “large hierarchies perform better when information can be costlessly 
“hardened”.” Stein shows in his work that the agent has more incentives to 
search for information in a decentralized model as there is nobody who can 
overrule his decision and therefore his effort to gather information won’t be 
useless. On the contrary, an agent does not have strong incentives to put a lot 
of effort into information gathering as his principle can always alter the agent’s 
decision and consequently the effort the agent puts into the search of 
information becomes useless. 
Prendergast (2002) investigates the relation between uncertainty and incentives 
and found, contrary to his assumption (which he drew from findings of other 
empirical researches in this scope, among others a research from Aggarwal et 
al.; 1999), a positive relation. Prendergasts’ argument that many researchers 
before him found negative correlations is, that most of them ignored a variable 
essential for calculating the relationship between risk and uncertainties, namely 
the allocation of authority. His idea is that if a firm operates in an uncertain 
environment, they are more likely to delegate authority to a person who holds 
more knowledge of this uncertain environment. Also an uncertain environment 
makes it harder to set up complete contracts, which also favors delegation. At 
the end, the firm will insert a higher degree of incentives for the person with 
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higher Authority in order to assure that this person acts in the firms’ best 
interest.  
Another paper by Itoh (2001), which deals with the tradeoff between delegation 
and centralization, shows that the choice of delegating tasks to multiple agents 
is the right one when there is perfect information. In other words, a coalition of 
agents is preferred when agents can monitor each other because of perfect 
information. Whereas when there is a lack of perfect information and when 
outcomes from tasks cannot be measured apart, from an incentive perspective 
it is considerably better to delegate a broad range of tasks to one agent. If one 
task remains in the principals’ rights and another one is delegated to an agent, 
incentives have to be given to both the agent and the principal. If the incentives 
given to the principal and the incentives given to the agent are not the same, a 
conflict may arise. This conflict can be avoided by allocating all the tasks to one 
agent, with the handicap for the agent to sustain the whole risk alone.  
Bester and Strausz (2007) also study the effects of delegation on incentives, 
when the success of a project depends on the effort of the agent. They state 
that delegation is becoming less likely the higher the degree of effort needed. 
Which is contrary to the predictions of Aghion & Tirole (1997). In a similar model 
from Bester and Krähmer (2008) the agents’ effort level depends also on 
monetary incentives and not only on the outcomes of the selected projects.  
 
5.1.3 Theories on real authority 
 
There is a new stream in literature trying to distinguish formal and real authority. 
Aghion et al. (1997) define formal authority as “the right to decide” and informal 
authority as “the effective control over decisions”. The allocation of information 
determines the degree of real authority in an organization and the information 
structure in turn depends on the formal authority structure. Baker et al. (1999) 
have a similar view and state, “decision rights cannot be formally delegated, 
they might be informally delegated through self-enforcing relational contracts.” 
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The key problem of the theory of real authority is the difficulty of its 
measurement. Researchers in the past heavily relied on organizational charts, 
surveys, job titles and descriptions to measure authority. But for Aghion et al. 
(1997) all this empirical analysis measure formal authority instead of real 
authority. Real authority holds the individual who occupies the subjective 
knowledge, because subjective or “soft” knowledge is not easy to transfer from 
a subordinate (who in many cases possesses this tacit knowledge) to a 
principal (the one who has the formal authority on decision making). Therefore 
the principal often just “rubber-stamps” the subordinate’s decision, hence the 
subordinate gains real authority.  
Therefore, to measure real authority you have to measure subjective 
knowledge. Li et al. (2009) state that it is almost impossible to find out who and 
to which extent an individual possesses subjective knowledge in an 
organization with the traditional measures of authority.  
Despite all these difficulties measuring real authority, Li et al. (2009) tried to 
measure real authority with the help of communication via conference calls. 
Past literature support their idea that human interactions and communication 
are the best mechanisms to find the existence of subjective knowledge.  
Except the empirical research from Li et al. (2009) and Hippmann et al. (2012), 
which strictly emphasize on the empirical distinction of real and formal authority, 
there are many other empirical studies that emphasize partly on the concept of 
real authority. Numerous citations show that the work of Aghion and Tirole, 
founders of the concept of real and formal authority, is one of the most 
important contributions from the last decade regarding the allocation of 
authority. 
In the collection of empirical studies in chapter 7 of this work, we will discuss 
empirical assessments on the measure of real authority as well as the measure 
of formal authority in detail. 
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5.2 Theories on authority in interorganizational networks  
 
Few important works based on the allocation of decision rights in networks have 
been published recently.  
Brickley et al (2003) found out that managers of smaller and more local banks 
have more decision rights than managers of large multinational banks due to 
the fact that local knowledge is more important and therefore decisions are 
decentralized. These small and local banks may lag behind in terms of 
conditions but make up for it with catering for the local needs thanks to their 
decentralized structure. Whereas managers of larger banks might score with 
better conditions but lack the decision making rights in order to specialize in 
their markets. 
Others argue that the allocation of decision rights depends mostly on the 
bargaining power of the parties. This was observed by Elfenbein et al. (2003) 
between internet portal owners and their suppliers of content as well as by 
Higgins (2006) between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. 
A study by Lopez & Lopez (2011) looked at the determinants of delegation of 
decisions in franchising networks. They hypothesized that delegation of 
decision rights to franchisees correlates negatively with the franchisors 
intangible assets and the brand name as well as with the amount of specific 
investments taken by the franchisees. On the other hand, the autonomy of 
franchisees correlates positively with the franchisees intangible assets and the 
interorganizational trust.  
Another study into the allocation of decision rights in franchising networks was 
done by Arruñada et al. (2005). Their article focuses on the franchising 
contracts between car manufacturers and their dealers and tries to give 
solutions to the moral hazard problem. The research analyzes the entire 
process and system of the allocation of decision rights including 
monitoring, punishment and reward and compensation schemes. 
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Arruñada et al. (2005) state that manufacturers grant more rights when 
the moral hazard of dealers is higher and the manufacturers reputation 
over opportunism is better.  
Azevedo (2009) explores in his paper the influence of the brand name on 
the distribution of decision rights on franchisor and franchisee and finds 
that the more important the brand name the more decision rights stay 
with franchisor.  
Another important name in the research on decision right allocation in 
franchise relationships is Windsperger. He did extensive research on this 
topic. In 2004 he derived a study in the Austrian franchise sector and 
found out that intangibility of franchisors system specific assets and the 
franchisees local market assets determine the allocation of decision-
making rights. In 2011 he investigated together with Mumdziev the 
German franchise sector and found that the contractibility of local market 
assets have a great impact on the decision making structure and makes a 
first step towards the measurement of real authority.  
As already stated in the chapter before, the only work measuring real and 
formal authority in interorganizational networks is the one by Hippmann et 
al. (2012). They argue that formal and real authority have a 
complementary relationship in joint ventures. 
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To summarize this chapter, a paper of Eldridge (2007) gives a good 
overview of the different decision structures and their implications. 
Decision structure Examples Implications 
 
Decisions are contractible 
(e.g. Aghion and Tirole) 
 
Formal authority 
 
Authority influences the 
decision-making process by 
changing the formal 
authority structures 
 
Delegation of decision rights 
is largely informal (e.g. 
Baker et al.) 
 
Empowerment, reputation, 
mechanisms for employee 
participation (e.g. information 
sharing) 
 
Informal organizational 
structures are important 
 
Interdependency and 
complementarity determine 
the scope of decision rights 
 
Venture capital, franchising, 
self-centred teams 
 
Activity bundles provide the 
basis for allocation of 
decision rights 
 
Table 2: Allocation of decision rights in organizations (modified from 
Eldridge; 2007) 
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As already shown in the first part, there are numerous recently written 
theoretical papers on the allocation of authority. Nevertheless and 
unfortunately, empirical studies are much less numerous and one can find 
many “empirical studies”, which rely more upon indications and experiences 
than on empirical evidences. An explanation could be that researches have 
troubles collecting suitable data for testing theoretical hypotheses empirically. 
Therefore it was not easy to find enough empirical studies that address the 
same key question and as a result it was necessary to dig deeper and broaden 
the research. Consequently empirical investigations that have their main focus 
on incentives or knowledge instead of the delegation of decision-making rights 
are included in the research list. 
The following table gives a good overview of the existing empirical 
investigations. The reader has the possibility to see the paper’s main scopes, 
their underlying theoretical concepts and their key variables used at one glance. 
Main attention is drawn on the formalization of variables as well as the data 
collection and the statistical methods used to calculate authority. The main goal 
of this collection of empirical studies is to find the most accurate formula for the 
measurement of authority in organizations by comparing existing intentions of 
the measurement of authority and their limitations. As a result, it is shown that 
there is still a lot of empirical research to do and implications how to assess 
future researches in means of the quality of data sets and the formulation of 
variables are given. In other words, this list should clear the way for future 
researches. 
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After providing the list of empirical studies with their parameters, every work will 
be discussed in more detail and compared in means of their specific 
formalization of variables and the different methods of measurement used in 
order to connect the numerous theories to corresponding empirical findings.  
The following part is structured on the concept of real and formal authority from 
Aghion and Tirole (1997). Most empirical studies on the allocation of authority 
do not explicitly distinguish between these two authorities in their papers, but 
treat them as one and the same. Therefore papers were classified in either 
studies on real or formal authority due to their measurement of delegation. If the 
formalization of the variable authority relies on objective data such as job 
descriptions or organizational charts, they are obviously measuring formal 
authority. If the allocation of authority is measured by questions responded to 
by agents, the outcome will be closer to real than to formal authority. As agents 
are asked to rate their influence on certain decisions, they will do so by rating 
their actual influence and not the influence they should have according to their 
job description. If principals like CEO’s are asked to rate the influence of their 
lower-level employees on certain decisions, the answers will reflect mostly the 
official decision making structure determined by organizational charts and job 
descriptions and are therefore counted as measure of formal authority. As for 
these classifications, one has to bear in mind that boarders between real and 
formal authority are blurry. Furthermore if subjective data (like in this case the 
rating on one owns influence on decisions) is used for the calculation of real 
and formal authority, it is almost impossible to assign findings definitely and 
without fail to either one of the two authorities.  
However, as shown in this study, the variables influencing the allocation of 
formal and/or real authority are similar for both measures. Thus, this paper will 
first discuss the latest empirical studies on the allocation of formal authority and 
then concentrate on the studies, which are based on the theory of real authority. 
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6.1 Studies on formal authority 
 
The work will distinguish not only between real and formal authority, but also 
between empirical studies made on intraorganizational networks and empirical 
studies made on interorganizational networks. It will do so, because authority 
and decision right allocation are more sensitive in interorganizational networks 
and face slightly different problems due to different organizational designs, 
architectures and strategic plans of two autonomous, but yet interrelated 
entities.  
6.1.1 Formal authority in intraorganizational networks 
 
As most of the researches rely on well known, already mentioned, main 
theoretical and conceptual foundations, this work will try to classify the 
examined empirical studies into their underlying main theoretical concept. As 
the reader will notice, many of the researchers use ideas from more than just 
one theoretical framework. Therefore the work will always indicate if the authors 
use more than one theory.  
 
Property Rights Theory 
The first empirical study to discuss is a work of Christie et al (2003) who based 
their study on the theory of property rights and used decentralization as a 
dependent variable. They formulate two main variables: first, specialized 
knowledge that consists of growth, uncertainty, size and knowledge 
specialization. Second, externalities and regulation based on the firm’s primary 
industry. Their variable for decentralization is based on objective data about the 
scope of the second level – if the second level in the hierarchy is either a cost 
or a profit center. According to Christie et al. (2003), cost centers have fewer 
rights over decisions than profit centers. Profit center managers mostly have 
control over revenues and costs whereas cost center managers mostly just 
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have decisions rights over either revenues or costs. Conducting a regression 
analysis with decentralization as dependent variable, Christie et al. (2003) 
found that firms facing higher uncertainties, holding more specialized 
knowledge, having higher growth measures, being bigger and unregulated tend 
to be less centralized.  
 
Demers et al. (2002) likewise investigate the concept of complementarities vs. 
substitutes in organizational design by applying both, agency and property 
rights theory. Using data collected via face-to-face or telephone interviews with 
internet based B2C (business to consumer) firms in the U.S., they defined three 
key variables and a long list of control variables. These variables are incentive 
compensation, performance measurement and the allocation of decision rights.  
Special attention will be drawn to their formulation of decision rights, as for this 
work it is the most important one. In accordance with the work of Windsperger 
et al. (2005), also Demers et al. (2002) used a survey-based measure to 
calculate the allocation of decision rights. But as they state in their paper they 
use a method developed by Nagar (2002) because “…Nagar (2002) improves 
on the measures in the prior literature by using the factor score extracted from 
an analysis of four survey questions related to hiring, promotion, branch hours, 
and sales process changes as his metric for the delegation construct.” 
Furthermore, the variable includes three proxies that might have an influence 
on the allocation of decision rights, namely knowledge transfer costs, the span 
of control of a department and if the CEO is also the founder of the firm. This 
questionnaire asked CEO’s to rate the delegation of different rights to lower-
level employees. This is more a measure of formal authority because the CEO 
will mostly stick to official job descriptions and organizational hierarchies while 
answering questions. In contrast to agents, who are more likely to rely on 
personal sensations and feelings. However, the principal could also give 
subjective information but probabilities will be lower for a principal than for an 
agent to rely on real authority. 
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With the help of a structural equation model they tested interdependent 
relationships between the three elements of organizational design. Findings 
result in a strong relationship between performance measurement and the 
delegation of decision rights to lower-level employees. Which is not a big 
surprise as financial measures act also as a control mechanism and therefore 
enhances delegation. Moreover they found out that incentive pay and 
delegation are alternatives, meaning that if incentive payments increase, 
delegation of decision rights decline. They found no significant evidence that 
delegation decreases if the founder of the firm is also the CEO, yet they 
empirically identified that a higher span of control leads to an increase in 
delegation of decision rights.  
 
Agency Theory 
Venky Nagar (2002) also contributed with his research on delegation and 
incentive compensation to the empirical understanding of the relationship of 
these two organizational design components. He provides first empirical 
evidence for the theoretical assumption that the choice of delegation and 
incentive compensation happens simultaneously. He granted access to rich 
data sets from an existing survey on senior executives and branch managers of 
retail banks and matched it with another source providing bank call reports. 
Finally the sample size contained data from 100 different banks.  
He defined delegation as “the sum of the branch managers authority in hiring, 
promoting, setting hours and changing selling processes”, as already described 
above in this work. He chooses the number of acquisitions the bank made as 
exogenous variable, which makes sense because the purchases should lower 
the degree of delegation. Incentive compensation is seen as the percentage of 
the wage that is bonus-based and branch manager’s education and experience 
is the corresponding exogenous variable. Furthermore he introduces firm’s 
growth, innovations and volatility of earnings as determinants of the two 
variables.  
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After running empirical tests (descriptive statistics, correlations) and a 2SLS 
regression analysis with both components as dependent variables (delegation 
and incentive compensation) he shows empirical evidence that the choice to 
delegate decision rights to lower level employees and the extent of employees 
wages depending on incentives, are dependent. Nagar (2002) found that the 
more unstable, fast growing and innovative banks are, the more they tend to 
delegate decision rights. On the other hand, employees with more decision 
rights have a greater amount of incentive payments. What is interesting, is that 
he did not find any effect of incentive pay on delegation choice, as predicted by 
agency theory.  
 
Similar to Nagar (2002), also Baiman et al. (1995) investigated the allocation of 
tasks and compensation choices, with the difference of analyzing them 
separately. He granted access to the data used from two major human 
resource-consulting firms who by themselves collected the data via survey and 
their target groups were CEO’s of corporations, groups and divisions. They 
collected information concerning salaries and annual bonus of executives and 
the extent to which tasks are allocated to business units. After classifying the 
surveys in industry codes they could work with a sample of at least 50 
observations in 16 different two-digit SIC codes.  
Their variables include compensation risk (“ratio of contingent annual 
remuneration to total annual remuneration”), task allocation (which is either one 
or zero as found in the research of Christie et al. (2002)), relative importance of 
a business unit (which they calculate by dividing business unit sales by total 
sales of the corporation) and the principals relative expertise (which is either 
one or zero depending if the corporation acts in the same two-digit code than 
the division or not). As one can see, Baiman et al. (1995) only construct a 
binary proxy for delegation, which is prone to erroneous results. After testing 
the statistical difference of their variables with t- and z-tests they conduct a OLS 
regression with the allocation of tasks as dependent variable. However, his 
results are not very surprising as he found “…strong evidence that 
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compensation risk increases with the business unit’s relative importance and 
that compensation risk is a decreasing function of the principal’s relative 
expertise when business unit’s relative importance is high.” (Baiman et al. 
2005). Regarding the decision right allocation he found empirical evidence that 
the allocation of tasks to division managers increase when the corporate CEO’s 
relative expertise is low, ergo the division is less important to the headquarter. 
 
Foss et al. (2005) also investigate predictions from the agency theory, namely 
relations between delegation, performance pay and risk relying on a database 
with data from questionnaires of 2000 Danish firms in all industries with more 
than 20 employees. Results of their probit models confirm the theories of 
Prendergast (2002): environmental uncertainty favors pay-for-performance 
compensation, more dynamic firms with a higher innovation level tend to be 
more decentralized and delegation and environmental uncertainty have a 
positive, significant relation.  
 
Like Foss (2005), Demers (2002), Nagar (2002) and DeVaro (2010), also Wulf 
(2007) investigated the correlation of authority, risk and incentive payment in 
the concept of agency theory. The data set is similar to the one Nagar used in 
2002 for his research, namely longitudinal compensation data on U.S. firms and 
their divisions, but their measurement is rather weak. Measurement for authority 
is a combination of the divisional manager’s status as an officer (or not) and his 
level in the hierarchy. Incentive measurement is derived from a manager’s 
annual salary and bonus. Results obtained from regression analysis with 
compensation pay as dependent variable and the allocation of authority as 
independent variable, are consistent with other findings mentioned earlier and 
the predictions of the agency theory.  
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Liberti et al. (2009) is using a data set that is different to all empirical studies 
already mentioned, investigating the effect of hierarchies on the information 
use. Information of credit folders of over 400 clients of a multinational Bank in 
Argentina is used as well as the information on which hierarchical level the 
actual approval of the loan is taking place. The interesting part is that the 
hierarchical level, where the loan will be approved is determined before a loan 
officer has to go to the bank to collect information. This knowledge of who will 
decide over the loan will impact the loan officer’s incentives for the information 
search. Like Wulf (2007), also Liberti et al. (2009) uses the allocation of 
authority as independent variable in their regression analysis and ordered probit 
model. The dependent variable in this case is the use of information. And the 
findings confirm this idea: a loan officer has fewer incentives to search for 
information when he has limited control over the use of the information collected 
by him. Furthermore the use of subjective (soft) information gets harder, the 
greater the hierarchical distance between sender and receiver of the 
information.  
 
Transaction cost theory 
An innovative approach to examine the allocation of decision rights based on 
transaction cost theory was chosen by Vázquez (2004). He argues that by now, 
almost all researches were based on organization theory, which has limitations 
such as the complete contracting view or the ignorance of opportunistic 
behavior of principals. Therefore he tries to link these two theories in order to 
gain new empirical insights on the theory of delegation.  
Data for this study was collected via questionnaires and was sent to all firms 
operating in the Spanish electronics and food industries with a certain size (over 
3 million Euros turnover in 2000). Vázquez (2004) chose these two industry 
sectors in order to have the required diversity to represent the whole industrial 
sector of any country - the electronics industry for their dynamic characteristics 
and the food industry for its stable nature. At the end he collected 329 valid 
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responses. Variables include centralization of strategic and operational 
decisions, teamwork, specialization, parametric uncertainty, worker opportunism 
and frequency (average time operators spend to conduct their main task) to 
name the more common ones. Explanations of their measurement are needed 
for the following variables: managers opportunism is measured by questions 
about the disrespect concerning before agreed upon limits, for example one 
question is “some operators cannot always use up their holidays because of 
production needs”; human specificity is the time a new worker needs to catch-
up with their working colleagues in terms of productivity; temporal specificity is 
“related to investments in a specific design of the production process that cause 
lock-in effects among different work stations”, asked for with questions such as 
“getting zero stock is a primary objective for the firm”. He added also control 
variables derived from organizational theory, such as firm size and age, 
dependencies on other firms and the degree of unionism of the firm (Vázquez, 
2004).  
For his regression analyses, centralization was used as dependent variable on 
the independent variables uncertainty, opportunism and knowledge specificity. 
OLS and ML regression analyses proved the variables derived from 
organization theory to be significant. More interesting are the results of the 
variables based on the transaction cost theory, for example, he found that less 
strategic decisions are being delegated in firms where managerial opportunism 
is higher. Significant evidence is also found for the relation of managerial 
opportunism and human specificity – if the opportunism of a manager in a firm 
is relatively low, human specificity is relatively high. Also, temporal specificity 
correlates negatively with centralization of decisions with short-term 
consequences. An interesting finding is that frequency has a relationship with 
more centralization of operating decisions and higher degree of specialization. 
The author explains this outcome with the possibility of standardizing 
reoccurring transactions and decisions and therefore cut costs.  
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6.1.2 Formal authority in interorganizational networks 
 
As already explained in Chapter 4, the term network has a broad meaning and 
many different definitions. In this chapter, which deals with empirical studies on 
the allocation of authority and decision rights in interorganizational networks, we 
will stick to the two types of networks mostly discussed in literature, namely 
franchise networks and joint ventures.  
 
Property Rights Theory 
One researcher who did extensive work in this field is Josef Windsperger 
(2002a; 2003a; 2003b; 2005; 2009a; 2009b; 2011). With his empirical studies 
on German and Austrian franchise networks and on Hungarian joint ventures he 
contributed to the empirical understanding of decision right allocation and the 
relation of ownership and decision rights in networks according to the property 
rights theory.  
All of Windsperger’s works discussed here are classified as measures of formal 
authority because he measures authority based on responses of just one 
partner of a network. In the cases were allocation of authority was tested in 
franchising networks, “decision rights were measured by asking franchisors to 
assess the influence of franchisees on decisions in the following areas: 
procurement, price, product, advertising, recruitment, training, investment, 
finance decisions, and accounting system.“ (Windsperger 2011:p.453; 2002a; 
2003; 2004; 2005;). The same question was asked to partners in joint venture 
relations in order to study the allocation of decision rights in Hungarian joint 
ventures. (Windsperger 2009a; 2009b). I believe by asking for the influence of 
franchisees on certain decisions and not for their contractual agreements upon 
decision making, researchers can draw some conclusions and make theoretical 
assumptions about the allocation of real authority. However, to get empirical 
evidence a data set should also include information about how agents (in this 
case franchisees) rate their own influence on certain decisions.  
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Nevertheless, in the view of property rights theory, intangible assets are the key 
to understanding the decision making structure of organizations and networks. 
In Windsperger (2003) empirical prove is searched for the following hypothesis: 
more decision rights should be centralized (stay with the franchisor) if system-
specific assets which are hardly contractible are higher in relation to the non-
contractible local market assets of the franchisee. With survey data collected in 
1998 from 153 questionnaire-responses of German franchisors, three variables 
were measured: Decision rights (measurement as explained above); 
Knowledge assets: measured by franchisors intangible knowledge assets 
(composed of annual training and meeting days and the number of outlet visits 
per year) and franchisees intangible knowledge assets. (rated by the franchisor 
on a 5-point scale); Ownership rights (measured as percentage on total sales of 
the royalty rate). He tested his hypothesis with the help of logistic regression 
analysis and used decision rights as dependent variable on knowledge assets 
and ownership rights. Empirical support was found for the prediction that 
franchisors system specific assets have a direct influence on the allocation of 
residual decision rights. Also, Windsperger (2003) found with correlation 
statistics that ownership rights and decision rights act as complements.  
 
In a second paper (Mumdziev & Windsperger 2011) the same data set was 
used to show that specific assets of franchisor and franchisee only have an 
influence on the decision making structure if their assets are not easily 
contractible (in other words, if they are based on tacit knowledge). Put 
differently, if specific knowledge of franchisor and franchisee is contractible, 
system and local market assets have no impact on the allocation of authority in 
franchising. Moreover, results show that the more system specific knowledge a 
franchisor owns, the less decision rights will be delegated to a franchisee. Also 
this time, decision rights were used as dependent variable in a multiple 
regression while specific assets of both parties were used as explanatory 
variables. 
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With another data set of 83 valid questionnaires received from Austrian 
franchisors in 1997, Windsperger (2002a; 2004; 2005) continued searching for 
empirical support on the allocation of decision rights in franchising under the 
view of property rights. He used the same measurement for the variables 
knowledge assets, decision rights and ownership rights as in the before 
described studies.  
The results from his work in 2002 show that in a property rights view, system 
and market specific assets are strongly interrelated with the structure of 
decision rights as well as that ownership and decision making rights act as 
complements. He tested that with non-parametric tests, namely with an h-test 
and a median test. In 2004, Windsperger extended the knowledge about 
decision making authority in franchising by another empirical research on the 
same data with the evidence that the system specific assets of the franchisor 
have a greater impact on decision right allocation than franchisees local market 
knowledge. This time using logistic and ordinal regression analysis both, with 
and without control variables, to determine the dependent variable, namely 
decision right allocation. In 2005, Windsperger and Yurdakul found another 
prove according to the complementary view of ownership and decision making 
rights by adding SLS and 2SLS regression analysis to their measurement 
methods with respect to the work in 2004 – the party which holds more decision 
rights that “create a large part of the residual income”, gets more ownership 
rights assigned.  
 
Windsperger (2009a; 2009b) also did some research on the allocation of 
authority under property rights view in Hungarian joint ventures. Data was 
collected via questionnaires from CEOs of joint venture companies between 
2004 and 2005. The final sample size was 80. The variable for intangible 
knowledge assets was defined by the question on how much specific 
knowledge of different value chain activities one partner holds in relation to the 
other partner. The variable residual decision right, again, was measured by 
asking one partner about the extent of decisions rights the other partner holds 
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on certain decisions. Ownership rights were calculated as the percentage of 
ownership held by partners. Control variables such as firm size, joint venture 
experience and technological uncertainty are introduced in the empirical 
research. Both empirical test results (in 2009a and 2009b regression analysis 
with decision rights as dependent variable) were concordant on the positive 
relationship of intangible assets and the allocation of decision rights. In other 
words, the more intangible assets (specific knowledge) a partner holds, the 
more residual decision rights are granted to him. Also, the allocation of residual 
decision rights correlates positively with technological uncertainty and the size 
of the joint venture. Which is explained respectively by “knowledge spillover 
risk“ and “economics of scale of coordination” (Windsperger 2009a). 
 
López-Fernández et al. (2011) also examined the determinants of the allocation 
of decision rights between franchisors and franchisees. Their research is based 
on a sample of 163 questionnaires answered by Spanish franchisors. Like most 
of the other researchers, the level of delegation is used as dependent variable 
and is measured by a rating from franchisors on the decision rights of 
franchisees. Independent variables include franchisors system specific assets 
(called “brand-name value” by the authors and include advertising expenditure 
by outlet, percentage devoted to franchising from the business model of the 
franchisor and the number of employees in the headquarter); system specific 
investments of franchisees, possibilities of franchisees to own multiple outlets, 
the age of the chain as a measure of trust and the franchisees local knowledge, 
which is measured by industry. With these variables, an ordinary least square 
regression model is conducted. Their most significant finding is that the more 
valuable the brand name, ergo the more franchisors invest in advertising and 
the larger the headquarters, the less decision rights are delegated to 
franchisees.  
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Another interesting piece of research on the contractual allocation of decision 
rights in manufacturer-dealer relations in Spain is done by Arruñada et al. 
(2011). The analysis is based on almost all car dealer contracts in Spain. This 
data set differs from the rest of the empirical studies discussed, because the 
information is only based on objective data and therefore we get the fist 
measure of strictly formal authority in interorganizational networks. The theory 
to be tested is “…the level of discretion available to manufacturers should 
increase with the risk of dealer moral hazard…” (Arruñada et al., 2011). The 
dependent variable formulated is the amount of rights assigned to the 
manufacturer, which is clustered in completion, monitoring and termination. As 
independent variables count: the quality of the car (measured by retail list 
price), the quantity of dealers in the network as well as the duration of the 
relationships. As control variable, the origin of the manufacturer was added 
since decision right assignment varies strongly in different continents (e.g. 
Asia). After running regression analysis they came to the finding that in the car 
industry exists contractual asymmetry with respect to decision rights. 
Manufacturers are granted implementation and enforcement rights while limiting 
decision-making rights of dealers tremendously. Also, a variation depending on 
the network is found: manufacturers in larger networks selling more expensive 
cars are granted more rights than to manufacturers in smaller networks selling 
lower quality cars.  
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6.2 Studies on real authority 
 
Most of the empirical researches in this section did not distinguish between real 
and formal authority, actually, they did not even mention the concept of real vs. 
formal authority. But they are classified as “studies on real authority” because of 
their measure of delegation/allocation of decision rights. All of these papers 
formulated the variable by questioning the agents (lower-level employees) how 
much influence they have on different decisions in relation to their superiors. As 
answers to these questions were given by the agents themselves and since 
they were asked about their influence and not about their contractual decision 
rights, the author classified this measure as a measure of real authority. 
Furthermore, as the author could not find empirical researches on the allocation 
of real authority in interorganizational networks, this chapter will only discuss 
the allocation of real authority in intraorganizational networks. 
 
The first empirical study to discuss is a work by Abernethy et al. (2004) which 
focuses on the property rights theory and investigates two complementary 
concepts of control: decentralization and performance measures. In their 
research they use the same two main determinants for both concepts, namely 
information asymmetry between two levels in the hierarchy and divisional 
interdependencies, which can occur when decision rights are passed on to a 
division manager who has incentives to improve his own performance no matter 
which effect his action has on other divisions.  
They gained their data by personal questionnaires using Likert scales asking 
division managers of firms listed in the Amsterdam stock exchange. A sample 
size of 78 valid questionnaires was reached. They measure the level of 
decentralization by the relation of the division manager’s influence and their 
superior’s influence on 5 different decisions. Measuring this way, they tried to 
capture real authority in the concept of Aghoin et al (1997). The performance 
measurement for the division is calculated as own-level measures from Keating 
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(1997). To formulate the variable interdependences they were asked how much 
influence has an activity of their division on other divisions and the same 
question the other way round. They use as well the variables of total outgoing 
and incoming goods and services to/from other divisions and the extent to 
which they could work as an autonomous firm. To calculate the variable of 
information asymmetries they asked division managers to which extent they are 
better informed than their superiors. They also added the managers age and 
experience to this variable. Finally Abernethy et al. (2004) used division-specific 
factors, moral hazard and the characteristics of the division manager as control 
variables.  
Their most interesting finding after running descriptive statistics and two OLS 
regressions (one with performance measures and another with decentralization 
as dependent variable) is that both main determinants have a significant impact 
on the choice to decentralize. Information asymmetry correlates positively and 
interdependencies negatively with decentralization. Similar findings can be 
found in the paper of Christie et al. (2003) whose measure for decentralization 
(allocation of authority to profit and costs centers) was realized in the concept of 
formal authority, as he captured this variable based on the type of center, cost 
or profit, of the second level.  
 
Another important contribution to the topic of decision right allocation is from 
Windsperger et al. (2005) who investigated the allocation of residual income 
and decision rights in the Hungarian trucking industry. They collected their data 
with a survey for truck drivers in the Austrian-Hungarian border and finally had a 
useful sample of 126 questionnaires. Applying property rights theory, they 
formulated three variables: residual income (proportionally to their total income), 
residual decision rights by asking them to rate their influence on a 7-point scale 
on certain decisions (which refers to the drivers real authority) and the drivers 
intangible knowledge assets. Windsperger et al. (2005) applied agency theory 
for his fourth main variable, namely monitoring costs that consist of the distance 
and days of transport and the number of different destinations. Furthermore, 
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two control variables are added, namely the size of the company the drivers are 
working for and their experience measured in active working years in this job.  
Analyzing the data with descriptive statistics and 2SLS regressions with the 
prediction of interrelation of residual income and decision rights, they confirmed 
their hypothesis that the more intangible assets a driver owns, the more 
decision rights are being delegated to him. Furthermore, monitoring costs are 
influencing income and decision right allocation in terms of duration and number 
of destinations of a single carriage. Another interesting finding of this paper is 
that under work contracts, residual income and decision rights are substitutes, 
meaning that the more residual income rights a driver owns, the less decision 
rights the company has to allocate to the driver.  
 
Another extensive researcher in this field is Jed DeVaro et al. (2010; 2012) who 
also tested Prendergast’s theory empirically. Their sample is drawn from the 
British Workplace Employee Relations Survey from 1998 covering random 
workplaces with at least 10 employees. Data was collected via two different 
questionnaires for two different respondent groups, namely managers and 
employees. This is a crucial point, because so far DeVaro (2010) is the first 
whose data set includes information from both, principals and agents, which in 
turn makes his findings more comprehensive than many others. Their final 
sample size counted 1590 questionnaires.  
Furthermore his measurement for risk in comparison with the measurement 
used by Foss (2005) is more accurate and therefore not as prone to errors. 
Foss (2005) assigned every firm in their sample to one out of 70 industries and 
then calculated the variance of the profits of all firms belonging to the same 
industry. In contrast, DeVaro (2010) measured risk/uncertainty for every single 
firm included in the data set by deciding if “the current state of the market for 
the main product or service of the establishment is described as turbulent”. The 
other two measures are quite similar to the ones used by Foss in 2005. 
Incentive pay is measured by a binary proxy on whether employees receive 
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payments according to their performance. Worker authority is measured by a 4-
scale question in the survey for the agents on how much influence agents have 
according to their range of tasks. Congruent with earlier studies (Foss (2005); 
Demers (2002); Nagar (2002)) his different probit regressions (with depend 
variables performance pay and authority) confirmed a strong and positive 
dependency of incentive pay and risk on the degree of authority of lower-level 
employees.  
 
Jed DeVaro used the same data again in 2012 to prove his hypothesis that the 
relationship between incentives and delegation of authority depends on the type 
of job occupied. The same variables as in his empirical research of 2010 are 
used, with the difference that he classified jobs into “complex” jobs and “simple” 
jobs with the codes provided by the Standard Occupational Classification. He 
ran 3 probit models with 3 different measures for incentive pay as dependent 
variables and as key independent variable, delegation of authority was used. 
He confirmed a positive relationship of incentives and delegation of authority for 
jobs classified as “simple” but a negative relationship for jobs classified as 
“complex”.  
 
The last empirical study to mention in this chapter is a work of Colombo et al 
(2004). His data set is based on a questionnaire on plant managers (agents) of 
Italian manufacturing plants. The questionnaire includes questions regarding 
the level of hierarchy where strategic decisions about “introduction of new 
technologies, investments in new product lines, investments in stand-alone 
machinery, hiring and firing personnel, career paths and designs of incentive 
schemes” are made. Variables determining the allocation of decision rights are 
the size and the complexity of the plant, if the plant has sub-contractual 
relations to costumers, the urgency of decisions (just-in-time production), the 
use of information technology to connect headquarters with plants and the 
capital intensity (which is the use of expensive equipment). After determining all 
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variables that could have an effect on the allocation of authority, ordered probit 
models tested the influence of explanatory variables on either labor or capital 
decision-making rights as well as for both. Results of the empirical tests show 
that the more information (measured by complexity and size of the plant) is held 
by the plant manager, the more decision rights will be delegated to him. If a firm 
holds more plants, decision rights will be more centralized. Finally, Colombo et 
al. (2004) also found empirical evidence that the use of information 
technologies to connect plants with their headquarters tend to favor 
decentralization of decision rights to plant managers. 
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6.3 Studies on real and formal authority 
 
In this chapter the reader will find information on empirical researches, which 
tried to capture both, real and formal allocation of decision rights, in order to see 
the gap between real and formal authority. 
 
6.3.1 Intraorganizational networks 
 
The first researcher who tested the model of Aghion et al. (2007) and tried to 
measure both real and formal authority was the researcher-group of Li, Minnis, 
Nagar and Rajan in 2009. They measure real authority with conference calls 
under the assumption that the more a CEO talks in conference calls in relation 
to lower-level managers, the more knowledge he posses ergo the more real 
authority he is holding. Finally, 17400 CEO conference calls were recorded and 
analyzed with an average of 1142 annual observations within one firm. As 
determinants of CEO’s real authority, stock based incentives, the urgency of 
decision-making (measured for industries), the degree of technical expertise 
(measured by the research and development expenditures of the firm), the span 
of control (measured as number of direct reports to the CEO) and the task 
importance are used. As stated before, not only the CEO’s real authority was 
measured but also the CEO’s formal authority. Formal authority measure is 
based on three binary proxy variables: if the CEO is also the founder of the firm; 
if the CEO is also in the Board of Directors and is also the president of the 
organization; if the CEO is the only employee in the Board of Directors. 
Moreover, CEO characteristics were measured including “ownership of the firm, 
tenure, prestige and overconfidence”. Finally, CEO’s compensation was added 
as a variable.  
After conducting pearson correlations for all variables stated above and 
regression analysis for two dependent variables separately (CEOs’ real 
authority and CEO’s compensation), first empirical proof is provided for the 
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theoretical assumption that formal and real authority differ in their measure. 
They found that the variables they used to determine CEO’s real authority are 
all significant to the measure of real authority. Furthermore, their results show 
that the more real authority a CEO posseses, the more he earns.  
 
6.3.2 Interorganizational networks !
Another “first-timer” is Hippmann et al. (2012) who distinguish the allocation of 
formal authority and the allocation of real authority in the case of 
interorganizational networks, namely joint ventures (JV). The obtained data 
comes from a questionnaire answered by 60 different Austrian-East European 
joint ventures. The variable formal authority is based on different management 
positions held by JV partners. The more positions are held by one JV partner, 
the more formal authority is held by him. The allocation of real authority to the 
JV partner is defined by the comparative influence of the two JV partners on 
decisions concerning different value chain activities. Environmental 
uncertainties are based on the percipience of the JV partner concerning 
“variation of market prices, number of competitors, product development and 
predictability of demand” in the other JV partner’s home country. A binary proxy, 
depending on whether cultural distance between the two countries of the JV 
partners is seen as high or low, determines cultural uncertainties. Measurement 
of the variable intangible knowledge is based on the knowledge assets both JV 
partners are contributing to the joint venture concerning different value chain 
activities. The experience of JV partners outside their own countries and the 
type of industry JV partners belong to, are added as control variables.  
To be able to “simultaneously analyzing two correlated dependent variables (i.e. 
formal and real authority) among the same set of independent variables” they 
used a multivariate regression model to empirically test both measures of 
authority under the same explanatory variables. (Hippmann et al. 2012) 
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Evidence is shown that cultural uncertainties influence the allocation of both, 
real and formal authority whereas uncertainties deriving from the environment 
just have an influence on the allocation of real authority. Hippmann et al (2012) 
states that this could be explained by the fact that environmental uncertainties 
are not easy to predict and therefore hard to formalize in contracts. Another 
interesting finding is the significant positive correlation between knowledge and 
real authority. In other words, if the JV partner’s intangible knowledge grows, 
more real and formal authority are granted to him. Another finding is the 
complementary relationship between formal and real authority, meaning that if 
real authority increases, formal authority will increase too. Finally, a higher 
variance of real authority with respect to formal authority was found, which 
suggests that there are more variables influencing the allocation of formal 
authority.  
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In this chapter, a summary of the three most important components of empirical 
researches discussed in this work is given. These three components include the 
description of data sets, the formalization of the main variables and the 
statistical methods used to test the hypothesis.  
Data sets are mostly obtained from questionnaires, which are either send out by 
the researchers themselves or bought from third parties. Most of these 
questionnaires contain both, objective and subjective data. Whereas the 
objective data mainly serves for formulating control variables and the objective 
data for formulating the main variables (Abernethy et al., 2004; Baiman et al., 
1995; Christie et al., 2003; Demers et al., 2002; Foss et al., 2005; Hippmann et 
al., 2012; Windsperger 2002, 2003a, 2004). A different data set was used by 
Agarwal et al. (2010), namely loan-approving data from a major North American 
bank. Similar to the empirical study of Agarwal et al. (2010), also another 
empirical study was based on credit information of an Argentinean bank (Liberti 
et al., 2009). Another researcher (Arruñada et al., 2001) extracted the data 
used in their research from franchising contracts, therefore they just used 
objective data which in turn means that all their variables rely on formal 
authority. Li et al. (2009) collected their data via transcripts of conference calls 
and coded them to have numbers for their empirical research. As one can see, 
many different forms of data was used to investigate the same topic. 
 
Already knowing where the data comes from, the formalization of the main 
variables will be discussed. Main variables throughout my sample of empirical 
studies include the allocation of authority, incentive compensation, knowledge 
assets and uncertainties. 
 
Allocation of authority 
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In most of the empirical researches discussed, allocation of authority is used as 
dependent variable and researchers had different ways of formulating this 
variable. In most of the empirical studies, either principals or agents were asked 
to rate the others or one selves influence on certain decisions on a likert-scale. 
This could either indicate a formulation of more real (if agents were asked to 
rate their own influence) or more formal (if principals were asked to rate the 
influence of agents) authority (Abernethy et al., 2004; Colombo et al., 2004; 
Demers et al., 2002; DeVaro et al. 2010; Marino et al., 2009; Lopez et al., 2011; 
Moers, 2006; Nagar, 2002; Vázquez, 2004; Windsperger 2002, 2003, 2005, 
2009). There was only one study asking both, principals and agents, for their 
perception of authority allocation, namely DeVaro et al. (2012). As already 
mentioned, no strict boarder can be drawn between real and formal authority by 
formulating the variable in this way. However, other approaches of formulating 
the allocation of authority is by counting the official hierarchical levels where 
decision are actually made and also a binary variable assigned either 0 or 1 if 
the principal requests a review of lower-level employees or not, was used. 
(Agarwal et al., 2010; Liberti et al., 2009). Arruñada et al. (2001) counted the 
decision rights allocated to franchisees defined in franchising contracts. The last 
three formulizations are strictly a measure of formal authority as they rely on 
contracts and organizational charts. Li et al. (2009) distinguished between the 
variables for real and formal authority, where real authority was determined by 
the amount of spoken words of CEO’s in conference calls and formal authority 
was formulated by double-functions (either the CEO is also the founder of the 
company, a member of the board of directors or acts also as president of the 
company) of the CEO in his organization.  
 
Incentive compensation/performance measurement 
The degree of incentive compensation was mainly an objective data calculated 
as the proportion of pay per bonus. (Nagar, 2002; Windsperger et al. 2005). 
Others used a binary variable if incentive compensation is used or not (DeVaro 
et al., 2010; Foss et al., 2005). Subjective measurement was used by 
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Abernethy et al. (2004) and Demers et al. (2002) who asked respondents to 
rate their annual incentive compensation on a predetermined scale.  
 
Knowledge assets/information 
Subjective data was used to formalize the variable of knowledge allocation by 
asking to rate the advance in information and knowledge contribution with 
respect to the other party on different activities on a scale. (Abernethy et al. 
2004; Windsperger). Other formulated this variable with the help of objective 
data such as experience (counted in years), geographical distance, number of 
lines, industries, value of the brand name, annual training days or annual outlet 
visits.  
Uncertainties/risk 
Different types of uncertainties were considered in the empirical studies 
discussed in this paper. Most of these studies take environmental uncertainties 
into account, such as the state of the market from the primary product of a 
company (DeVaro et al., 2010) or the firm growth, volatility of earnings and 
innovation (Nagar, 2002; Moers, 2006). Also, some researchers asked 
managers to rate the degree of innovation in their industry, their number of 
competitors or industry variance as well as the variation of market prices, 
product development and the predictability on demand in the sector they are 
operating in (Foss et al., 2005; Hippmann et al., 2012). Others use the length of 
relationship between two firms or job tenure within firms as a variable 
formulization for uncertainties (Arruñada et al., 2001). Furthermore, also 
technological uncertainty (Windsperger, 2009a) was taken into account in some 
of the researches.  
 
After having explained data sets and the formalization of variables, a closer look 
will be taken on statistical methods and techniques used to test for theoretical 
hypothesis.  
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Upon giving an overview of their main variables with descriptive statistics, every 
researcher conducted some sort of regression analysis. Most of them used the 
widely common ordinary least squares regression to test their dependent 
variable, which in most cases was the allocation of authority. (Arruñada et al., 
2001; Lopez et al., 2011; Windsperger et al., 2005). Fewer researchers took 
use of OLS regression analysis with authority as an explanatory variable 
(Agarwal et al., 2010; Liberti et al., 2009; Wu, 2011). Abernethy et al. (2004) for 
example, used OLS twice with 2 different dependent variables, namely 
decentralization and the importance of financial and quantitative measures for 
agents. Two stage OLS regression was used by Nagar (2002) for the variables 
delegation of authority and incentive compensation and from Windsperger et al. 
(2005) for the variables residual decision rights and ownership rights. Other 
commonly used regression models on this topic include ordered logit models, 
tobit models and probit models for binary responses.  
 
In the last chapter, the 3 components and their application in the empirical study 
sample used in this work, will be critically discussed and implications for future 
research will be given. 
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As this work shows, empirical research falls behind theoretical concepts on the 
topic of the allocation of authority, especially on the distinction in formulating 
variables and the measurement of real and formal authority.  
The majority of empirical papers on the allocation of authority did not even 
specify if they were investigating real or formal authority. Some measure 
authority with objective data, like organizational charts or contractual 
agreements (Arruñada et al. 2001; Agarwal & Hauswald; 2010; Liberti & Milan; 
2009), while others measure authority with subjective questionnaires designed 
for either principal or agents, asking them about the influence on decisions of 
the other party. (Abernethy et al, 2004; Christie et al., 2003; Colombo & 
Delmastro, 2004; DeVaro et al, 2002 & 2010; Lopez et al. 2011 & 2012; 
Windsperger et al. 2009a). Whilst just two researchers try to measure both real 
and formal authority (Hippmann & Windsperger 2012; Li et al., 2009).  
As a result, this paper tries to distinguish real and formal authority explicitly 
based on the measurement for authority used in each particular case. The 
author classified papers to investigate on real authority when their 
measurement for authority was based on questioning 
agents/employees/franchisees about their own influence on different decisions. 
This is due to the assumption that agents will rely more on the organizational 
reality rather than on contracts, organizational charts or job descriptions while 
filling out the questionnaire. On the other hand, empirical researches got 
classified as measuring formal authority either with objective data or with a 
survey designed for principals/managers/CEOs/franchisors, asking them to rate 
their agents’ influence on certain decisions. As a principal will rely more on 
contractual agreements or job descriptions while answering these questions, it 
will come closer to a measure of formal authority than a measure of real 
authority. However, one can also draw conclusions on the allocation of real 
authority by asking the principal how he rates the influence of the agent on 
certain value chain activities (more than when relying on contractual 
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agreements), but it is not safe to reveal empirical evidence on the allocation of 
real authority. One can’t see this classifications as black and white, ergo a 
measure of either pure real or pure formal authority, but as measures relatively 
more predicated on either of the two.  
The reason for their failure on the distinction can derive from the fact that it is 
very difficult to get an empirically meaningful data set to test real authority. As 
mentioned above, the empirical researches classified as measures for real 
authority did not strictly measure real authority. In order to have a more 
accurate measure of real authority, it would be necessary to have data on 
authority perception from both parts (principals and agents) in an intra- or 
interorganizational network. Also, it would be interesting to see the differences 
in authority perception of principals and agents within the same organization. 
Therefore a survey with two distinct questionnaires for principal and agents 
within the same sample would contribute to the empirical understanding of the 
concept of authority perception of the two and test my assumption that 
principals are more likely to stick to official authority allocation while agents are 
expected to stick more to the concept of real authority. 
Furthermore, as most researches rely on highly subjective data (personal 
perceptions) for measuring real authority, it would be valuable to measure real 
authority based on more objective data. Data for measuring who is holding the 
effective control over decisions could be obtained using call transcripts, memos, 
emails or meeting transcripts. Unfortunately, this is also the hardest, most 
expensive and most time-consuming data to acquire on a large scale. In the 
event of obtaining this data, formal authority would be easy to formalize with the 
help of organizational charts and job descriptions. Having the two measures for 
the same subjects of investigation, the gap between real and formal authority 
could be revealed and make a contribution to the understanding of 
organizational design. Furthermore the whole concept of two different 
authorities in an organization would gain validity. This would be an interesting 
implication for future researches.  
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Moreover, case studies could be an easy way to contribute to the empirical 
research of the allocation of real and formal authority. As already argued, the 
difficulty in acquiring data to test theoretical concepts has hampered the 
empirical investigation of the allocation of decision rights. Accordingly, case 
studies could help empirical researchers in terms of formulating hypothesis, 
testing established hypothesis or deriving variables and determinants. Sadly, 
case studies on the concept of real and formal authority are almost non-
existent.  
This work recorded the gap between theoretical models and empirical studies 
on the allocation of authority and gave an overview of the formalization of 
depending variables, existing statistical methods and techniques and 
explanatory variables determining authority in both, intra- and 
interorganizational networks. In addition, measurement methods and variable 
formulations were discussed and criticized regarding their liability and 
predisposition to produce erroneous results. Thus clearing the way for future 
researches.  
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Die Verteilung von Entscheidungsrechten sowie die Verteilung von Autoritäten 
in Unternehmen ist eine Schlüsselkomponente in der Architektur von 
Organisationen. Die Autoren Coase (1937) und Simon (1951) beschäftigten 
sich schon sehr früh mit der Verteilung von Entscheidungsrechten und erklären 
die Existenz von Autoritäten in Organisationen mit unvollständigen Verträgen. 
Zu unvollständigen Verträgen kommt es laut ihnen aufgrund von Unsicherheiten 
und der Nichtgreifbarkeit von Vorzügen verschiedener Akteure (wie zu Beispiel 
der Wissensverteilung innerhalb eines Unternehmens). Im Jahr 1997, zwei 
Forscher (Aghion und Tirole) entwickelten die differenzierte Sichtweise von 
realer und formaler Autorität. Laut ihrer Theorie muss man zwischen realen und 
formalen Autoritätsbeziehungen unterscheiden, wobei reale Autorität die 
effektive Kontrolle über Entscheidungen und formale Autorität, das tatsächliche 
Recht Entscheidungen zu treffen, ist. Trotz einer großen Sammlung 
theoretischer Beiträge auf dem Gebiet der Verteilung von 
Entscheidungsrechten in intraorganisationalen Hierarchien (Aghion & Tirole, 
1997; Baker et al., 1999; Brickley et al., 2003; Dessein, 2002; Fehr, 2010; 
Malone, 1997; March 1991; Nagar, 2002; Stein, 2002) und 
interorganisationalen Netzwerken (Azevedo, 2009; Elfenbein & Lerner, 2003; 
Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2011; Higgins, 2006), findet man dementsprechend 
wenige empirische Studien die all diese Theorien überprüfen. Gründe dafür 
könnten die Problematik in der Beschaffung plausibler Datensätze sein. 
Deswegen hat es sich die Autorin zur Aufgabe gemacht, eine lückenlose 
Übersicht der existierenden empirischen Studien zur Verteilung von 
Entscheidungsrechten innerhalb und zwischen Unternehmen, mit spezieller 
Aufmerksamkeit auf dem Konzept formaler und realer Autoritätsbeziehungen, 
zu geben. Außerdem möchte diese Arbeit den Forschern neue Ideen und 
Ansätze geben, sowie auch Lücken in der Forschung aufzeigen und damit den 
Weg für neue Forschungsansätze ebnen.  
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